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Introduction
A vast class of models of choice assume deterministic behaviour. This holds both for the classical 'rational'model (e.g. Samuelson [22] , Richter [17] ) and for more recent models of boundedly rational choice. But empirical economists have always had to confront the noisiness of the data. This raises the need to graft an appropriate error structure on the model, and therefore leads to the construction of a probabilistic choice model. Pioneering theoretical contributions in this area have been Luce [7] and Block and Marshak's [2] and Marshak's [15] Random Utility Maximization (RUM) model. In this paper we present a simple model of probabilistic choice from discrete choice sets (including RUM as a special case), with two main features:
1) The stochastic components of the model is given a precise interpretation.
2) Some parameters governing those components are endogenised via an equilibrium process.
The RUM model culminated in its most in ‡uential version, McFadden's ( [10] , [11] ) conditional logit (or multinomial logit) discrete choice model, in which the probability p(a i ; A) that alternative a i is selected from a choice set A takes the form p(a i ; A) = exp (u (a i )) = X a j 2A
exp (u (a j )) , where u (a j ) expresses the 'systematic utility' of alternative a j . 1 This model is a case within a general class in which alternative a i generates a 'random utility stimulus'u (a i )+ " i , where " i is an error term, and is chosen over alternative a j if u (a i ) u (a j ) > " j " i . In this perspective, the crucial step consists of de…ning an appropriate probabilistic structure on the errors. The logit model follows from the " i taking on i.i.d. Gumbel (or extreme value type I) distributions 2 . A probit model would follow instead by assuming normal distributions. In general, the basic constraint is that larger errors are made with smaller 1 In applications, it is usually assumed further that utility is a linear function of the alternative attributes. 2 Gumbel distribution function (with parameters and ): F (x) = exp e x . 2 probabilities, from which it follows that better alternatives are chosen with higher probability. Closely related ideas have also found their way in modelling strategic behaviour, for the …rst time with McKelvey and Palfrey's ( [13] , [14] ) notion of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) 3 .
This approach has proved to be extremely useful for experimental and empirical economics. But it seems fair to say that -beside the basic constraint of error monotonicity in utility -the error structure is not given a clear psychological foundation. Rather, it is chosen for analytical convenience from a standard set of statistical distributions, and then is added on to a determinsitic model. In other words, economic (or psychological) theory stops at the level of utility maximisation. 'Bounded rationality'follows from exogeneous random errors. This makes the error structure rather di¢ cult to assess and interpret. 4 We propose here a di¤erent route: we formulate directly a boundedly rational model of choice wihich includes some stochastic components. The main advantage of doing so is that the error structure becomes fully transparent, being part of the core model itself.
The stochastic components of this model are extremely simple and, especially, can be given a precise psychological interpretation.
The model focusses on the notion of a consideration set. The agent does not rationally evaluate all objectively available alternatives, but only a (possibly strict) subset of them, the consideration set. Once a consideration set has been formed, a choice is made by means of a preference relation, which in this paper we assume to be standard (complete and transitive). This two-step conceptualisation of the act of choice is rooted in psychology 3 See Goeree, Holt and Palfrey [4] for an overview. 4 In his Nobel lecture, McFadden [12] recounts of how he …rst developed the model in response to a speci…c practical problem, and then sought a theoretical foundation, which he found in the Gumbel error speci…cation within RUM theory. We recall here that the Gumbel distribution function can be seen as the limit distribution function of (a suitable transformation of) the maximum value statistics for a sample of N i.i.d. random variables, as N tends to in…nity. The statistics needs to be appropriately transformed when taking the limit since, obviously, letting G:be the common distribution function of the random variables and G M the distribution function of max (X i ) i=1;:::;N , we have In our model the formation of the consideration set is stochastic. It is in fact the only stochastic component of the model. For an alternative, the probability of membership of the consideration set depends on two types of parameters (probabilities). The …rst parameter ('rationality'), expresses the general propensity of the agent to consider all alternatives. The second parameter i ('salience') is alternative speci…c. We present two natural models (called AND and OR) that depend on the speci…c way the parameters combine to determine the probability of membership of the consideration set.
We show that for a special case (that of equal salience across alternatives) both models can be expressed in a logit format. However, we use only ordinal preference information.
Contrast this with the logit model which uses, as explained above, equations of the type
These equations are only invariant to common cardinal (a¢ ne)
transformations of the u and the errors, andf therefore contain cardinal information.
One advantage of expressing rationality in parametric form is that makes it easy to study how the probability of a given alternative being chosen varies with rationality.
We …nd that some of the 'intuitive'properties of error do not hold. One might expect, for example, that as rationality increases the agent will tend to choose each nonoptimal alternative with lower and lower probability: but we show that this is not necessarily the case. Both the AND and the OR models predict either monotonic or single peaked relationships between and the probability of choice, for all alternatives. The AND model predicts, for all alternatives and all parameters, an interval (and possibly the full interval)
in which the probability of choice increases with rationality. The OR model predicts an increasing interval for some alternatives and some parameter con…gurations, but forbids increasingness on the whole range except for the best alternative. Unexpected e¤ects may also occur (in the OR model) in respect of the odds (probability ratio) of choosing a better alternative over a worse alternative, which may decrease with . And in both 5 These three models are examples of the modern 'sophisticated models of choice behavior which are deterministic'we alluded to in the opening.
4 models the odds fail Luce's [7] Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives test (which implies, together with other assumptions, the logit model) 6 . Salience enters these relationships in a non-obvious way.
In the second part of the paper we endogenise salience. We consider situations in which alternatives can in ‡uence their own salience. There are many examples that …t this case. In electoral contests, politicians make statements to get noticed by the voters, not only to persuade them. Voters may not consider certain parties for cultural reasons or out of habit 7 (see Wilson [24] for a consideration set approach to political competition).
In animal mate competition the alternatives are male animals, the chooser is a female, and salience is controlled via natural selection (e.g. endowing peacocks with more or less showy tails), or by human activities (hair-styling, body-building, wealth-accumulation).
In an I.O. context the alternatives are products, and salience is controlled via marketing strategies (Eliaz and Spiegler's [3] work mentioned before is the …rst to study in detail this type of competitive situation). 8 Our main result is that, when alternatives can fully control their own salience ('absolute salience'), in equilibrium -under very general assumptions -both models have a 'the showiest is the best' feature: the equilibrium ordering of salience fully re ‡ects the preference ordering over alternatives.
However, when salience is relative (so that alternatives can control salience only partially), there exists fully perverse equilibria in both models. In such equilibria the worst alternative has the highest probability of being chosen.
All these results have a bearing for the inferences we draw on true preferences using revealed preferences reconstructed from choice data. We brie ‡y comment on such 6 In its core version. The nested logit, for example, allow for violations of IIA. A probit model also allows for such violations. See e.g. Agresti [1] for an overview of statistical methods for categorical data. 7 In Wilson [24] , for example, it is reported that African Americans tend to ignore Republican candidates in spite of the overlap betwen their policy preferences and the stance of the Republicans, and even if they are dissatis…ed with the Democratic candidate. 8 Examples in our discipline of factors a¤ecting salience might be the choice of research topic, or the title of a paper (an author wants to be read, reader has only a limited attention, catchy titles confer salience -we may imagine that 'choosing' here means 'remembering': the reader only puts e¤ort in remembering the best quality paper among those he has considered).
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implications in the concluding section.
2 Salience and rationality
The Model
There is a countable (possibly …nite) choice set of alternatives A = fa 1 ; :::; a n ; :::g. The agent has a strict preference ordering on A. We will often refer to the position of an alternative in the ranking as its quality, with a lower i indicating a higher quality, so that
While a standard rational consumer explores the entire choice set A and picks the maximal element according to , here is applied only to a consideration set C (A) A of alternatives (the set of alternatives he actively considers). We allow for the consideration set to be empty, in which case the chooser picks a default option a (e.g. walking away from the shop, remaining without a partner, abstaining from voting).
Membership of C (A) for the alternatives in A is probabilistic. The probability of membership combines two components (probabilities): an idiosyncratic component i 2 [0; 1] which is speci…c to the alternative and an alternative-independent component 2 (0; 1). We call the probability i the salience of alternative a i , and a list ( 1 ; :::; n ; :::) a salience pro…le. Note that while we use the term salience throughout for simplicity and because it tallies with leading examples, there are situations in which i is not associated with awareness of the alternative by the agent, but rather with the resistance of the agent to consider the alternative for choice (e.g. for ideological reasons).
The probability measures the general propensity of the agent to consider all alternatives. All else being equal, an agent with a higher is more likely, coeteris paribus, to apply his preference to the entire choice set A and can thus be interpreted as the agent's degree of rationality.
We consider two elementary probability models, both of which determine C (A) in two stages, as depicted in …gure 1. The sets at the terminal nodes indicate the destination of the alternative.
OR model: any alternative a i is drawn into the consideration set with probability i , and OR model AND model Figure 1 : Structure of the two models then all alternatives which haven't been drawn in this way are considered with probability . So
AND model: any alternative a i is provisionally drawn into the consideration set with probability i , and it remains there with probability . So
In both models, once the probabilistic consideration phase has been completed and a set C (A) has been formed, the agent chooses (if C (A) is nonempty) the alternative a i with the properties that
is empty he chooses the default option a . 9 Finally, observe that the models are invariant to permuting the order in which salience and rationality are applied.
The Logit Retrouvé?
There is a formal relation between these models and the RUM models. We begin by discussing a benchmark situation, in which both models collapse to a logit form. Let 
To see this, let's write down the choice probabilities explicitly. In the OR model, the
probability that a i enters C in the …rst stage and the alternatives better than a i do not enter C probability that a i enters C in the second stage and the alternatives better
In the AND model, the probability
probability that a i enters C (A) in the …rst stage and the alternatives better
probability that a i remains in C (A) in the second stage and the alternatives better than a i do not enter C (A) that is,
10 Use the convention that Q 0 j=1 (:) = 1.
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Consider now the case of a common level of salience 2 (0; 1), with = i for all i. Then the probability distributions are log-linear in quality
, with = log ( + ), = log (1 ) (1 ), 0 = log , and 0 = log (1 ).
It follows that, de…ning an (ordinal) utility function u representing on A by u (a i ) = 1 i
we can write the probabilities of choice conditional on the agent picking an element in A as in the statement of Proposition 1.
This observation provides a simple new psychological foundation for an often used error speci…cation. The OR and AND models can be seen in this perspective a class of 'distortions'of the conditional logit model, where the distortions arise from di¤erences in salience between the alternatives. For example in the OR model
and i may enter non-linearly in the expression through the term P j<i log (1 j ). It is important, however, to bear in mind that the logit structure only holds for (a¢ ne transformations of) the particular utility speci…cation assumed. As our models use ordinal preference information as primitive, the probability of choice can only be invariant to that type of information. Some allowed utility transformations will destroy the loglinear relationships. In other words, at a fundamental level the log-linearity only holds with respect to the quality ranking index.
Limiting behavior
The limiting behavior of the two models underscores notable di¤erences. In the limit as tends to 1, for any salience pro…le, the OR model clearly converges to the standard model of preference maximisation: the best alternative is considered with probability one, and therefore it is chosen with probability one. On the contrary, in the AND model there may still be a positive probability (depending on the salience pro…le) that the better alternatives are not considered, and therefore are not chosen.
Curiously, the limiting version of the AND model for high rationality coincides with the limiting version of the OR model for low rationality,
A moment's re ‡ection explains this with the fact that taking these opposit limits is the way to make consideration behavior be determined solely by salience in each of two models. Observe that the quality di¤erence e¤ect persists in the limit.
The limiting conditional probabilities of choice as vanishes are of interest:
These calculations highlight a further di¤erence from the logit (or quantal) models, which collapse to random choice as when the 'rationality'parameter of the logit tends to 0. In general the limiting behaviour for that tends to 0 is not purely random choice in our models. In both the OR and the AND model the salience di¤erence between alternatives is preserved in the limit. In addition the quality di¤erence between alternatives is preserved in the limit in the OR model (though not in the AND model).
The AND model obviously does collapse to random choice in the limit of low rationality in the common salience case (assume here the number of alternatives to be a …nite number n). 11 The OR model collapses instead to random choice in the limit of low rationality provided that common salience also vanishes:
Note that the order matters in the above repeated limit.
Basic Comparative Statics Properties
Some comparative statics properties are immediate and, in both the OR and AND model, as expected:
(salience responsiveness) the probability of an alternative being chosen increases in the alternative's own salience and decreases in the salience of the other alternatives;
(quality responsiveness) an increase in own quality 12 increases the probability of the alternative being chosen;
(monotonicity) if the salience ranking is (weakly) the same as the inverse quality ranking (i.e. i < j ) i j ), the probability that a better alternative is chosen is higher than the probability that a worse alternative is chosen. 13 However, the distribution of salience may scramble this association between quality and probability of being chosen. 11 Though not the OR model: in the common salience case we have
n i
12 More precisely, a permutation of the objects in the preference order which improves the ranking of the object. 13 So in particular this holds for the case of equal salience i = for some common 2 [0; 1].
Because p OR (a i ) and p AN D (a i ) are i th degree polynomials in , the e¤ect of an increase in rationality is more subtle. In this respect the status of the best alternative a 1 is di¤erent from that of all the other alternatives. For a 1 an increase in rationality is always good news in both models, with
(observe however that the two models have opposite implications concerning the e¤ect of salience on the impact of rationality).
A further observation stems from looking at the distribution functions, over quality levels, indicating the probability of choosing an alternative of at least a given level i of quality:
from which it is evident that, in both models:
(cumulative rationality responsiveness) For any quality level i, the probability of choosing an alternative of quality i or better is increasing in the degree of rationality.
But for individual alternatives di¤erent from the best, the probability of being chosen as a function of rationality depends in a non-obvious way on the parameters of the model.
3 Who gains from rationality?
OR model
In this section we discuss how the probability of choice for an alternative can vary nonmonotonically (but with at most one peak) in the OR model as rationality increases.
which is ambiguous in sign. The decomposition highlights the source of ambiguity. On the one hand, an increase in increases the probability that a i will be considered by the decision maker in the event, with probability (1 i ), that it has not entered the consideration set because of its salience; on the other hand, it also increases the probability that better alternatives are considered.
The threshold ranges in ( 1; 1] and attains its maximum setting i = 1. Therefore
is single peaked or monotonic on (0; 1) and p OR (a i ) attains a maximum, as a function of 2 (0; 1), at whenever 2 (0; 1). For p OR (a i ) to peak at positive levels of , it must be that i < The set of alternatives can thus be partitioned into in three types (according to when an increase in rationality is good news for the alternative), which we record as:
Proposition 2 p OR (a i ) has at most one peak as a function of 2 (0; 1). It is always increasing for i = 1. For any i > 1, p OR (a i ) is strictly increasing on an initial range i¤ i i < 1, and for su¢ ciently high, p OR (a i ) is strictly decreasing.
To summarise in words, for certain parameter values, the degree of rationality which maximises the probability that a given alternative (di¤erent from the top one but of su¢ cient good quality) is chosen, is an intermediate one. An increase in rationality is good news only for:
13
-the top alternative, always;
-alternatives displaying a combination of good quality and low salience, at su¢ ciently low rationality levels.
An agent with higher rationality may be less attracted by a good alternative (but not the best) if it has high salience.
Note that only own salience, and not the salience of the other alternatives, a¤ects the value of and thus the sign of the derivative. The e¤ect of own salience on (namely i i 2 )
is negative for i > 1 and zero for i = 1. A lower quality (increase in i) reduces the threshold 
AND model
The response of the probability of choice in the AND model as rationality increases is qualitatively di¤erent from that of the OR model, as we now demonstrate.
In order to highlight the role of it is instructive to rewrite the model with the To see why this notation is useful, let for example i = 4 and compute the probability p AN D (a 4 ) that alternative a 2 is selected. This is given by
3 )
The relevant index sets are s 3;1 = f1; 2; 3g, s 3;2 = f1; 2; 3g and s 3;3 = f1g, so that e.g. S (3; 2) (1) = 1 2 , S (3; 2) (2) = 1 3 , S (3; 2) (3) = 1 3 , and so on. Then we can
the probability that a i is chosen can be rewritten as:
We can now check how this varies with rationality:
Like in the OR model, the e¤ect of a change in on the probability of choice is ambiguous, but here there clearly exists b 2 (0; 1) such that
unlike in the OR model, there cannot be any sure-…re loser from an increase in rationality:
every alternative gains from increases in rationality, whatever the salience pro…le and the quality of the alternative, at su¢ ciently low levels of rationality (by taking away choice probability from the default alternative a ).
We now show that the threshold b , when it exists in (0; 1), is unique.
Proposition 3 For all i, p AN D (a i ) has at most one peak as a function of 2 (0; 1), and it is strictly increasing on an initial range. Moreover p AN D (a i ) can be strictly increasing on the entire interval (0; 1) even for i > 1.
All (easy but mostly tedious) missing proofs are relegated to a separate section.
The latter part of the statement highlights a major di¤erence from the OR model: in the AND model increases in rationality can be good news for inferior alternatives at all levels of rationality, something which cannot happen in the OR model.
Note …nally that, unlike in the OR model, the entire salience pro…le is relevant to determine the impact of rationality. We display the salience and quality e¤ect in the graph below, using the same values as for the OR model:
Choice Odds and Menu E¤ects
We have noted that the e¤ect of an increase in rationality on the probability of choice of any alternative which is not the best is ambiguous. But what about the odds of choosing a better quality alternative over a lower quality alternative? Even if the probability of choosing an inferior alternative increases with rationality, one may conjecture that it does so at a lower speed than superior alternatives, so that the odds of making a better choice increase. This conjecture is clearly true in the AND model. De…ning, for i < j,
we have immediately But the conjecture is false in the OR model, at low levels of rationality and low levels of salience of the inferior alternative, irrespective of the quality di¤erence between the two alternatives.
De…ne, with i < j,
Proposition 4 For all i; j with i < j, there exists 2 (0; 1) and j 2 (0; 1) such that, for < and j < j ,
Observe that both expressions for the odds violate Luce's [7] classical IIA axiom, which states that the choice probability ratio for two alternatives a i and a j is independent of the other alternatives in the choice set A. In our models 14 , this holds true only for changes in A which remove or delete alternatives each of which is either better or worse than both a i and a j . Inserting, for example, an alternative a l with a i a l a j in the choice 14 Imagining now that they apply to a collection of subsets of a universal set of objects X.
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set would change the terms (1
which appear in odds OR (i; j) and odds AN D (i; j), respectively. The insertion of such an intermediate alternative would make no di¤erence regarding the probability of choice of the better alternative a i , but would create a new event of probability ( l + (1 l ) ) ( j + (1 j ) ) in the OR model and ( l ) ( j ) in the AND model (namely the probabilities that a n and a j are both considered), in which the lower quality alternative is not chosen. As a particular implication of these observations, this means that odds OR (i; j) and odds AN D (i; j) are weakly increasing with the size of the choice set.
The dependence of the odds on the other available alternatives is often a realistic feature, which applied economist have sought to incorporate, for example, in the conditional logit model. 15 The blue bus-red bus problem is the standard example. Suppose the agent chooses with probabilities one third each the train (t), a red bus (r) or a blue bus (b) as a means of transport, so that the choice odds for any two alternatives are 1. Nevertheless, if r is removed from the choice set, it is natural to expect that the odds of choosing b over t become 2, rather than staying at 1 as required by IIA. In our model (once adapted to include ranking ties), the natural exaplanation for why the odds should change (that the agent ranks a blue bus and a red bus in the same way) immediately yields the odds change.
We are mainly interested in the question of how the equilibrium salience order correlates with the quality order (and in how this is re ‡ected in choice probabilities). The answer is not obvious a priori as incentives seem to run both ways. On the one hand the best alternative has a strong incentive to get noticed: it fears no competition. On the other hand, the only weapon the inferior alternatives have to have a chance to be chosen is to increase their probability of entering the consideration set.
In this section we assume that there is a …nite number of alternatives, and that the strategy set for alternative a i is a …nite subset S of the unit interval (below we illustrate how other domains could be considered). The payo¤ to each alternative is the expected probability of being chosen minus a (possibly negative) cost associated with the chosen salience level. One interpretation of this function is that alternatives either vie for one single chooser who chooses one alternative, or care about 'market share'with a continuum of identical choosers each of whom chooses one alternative. Formally, let e be a function e : S ! Re. The payo¤ to alternative i for a pure strategy pro…le 2 S n is
for the OR model and
for the AND model. We make no assumption on the function e. In particular, e can be increasing or decreasing. So e could be intepreted as e¤ort, when increasing salience is costly, or as elation, when increasing salience is pleasurable. When salience can be chosen endogenously, in equilibrium at any level of rationality the salience order coincides with the preference order.
Proposition 6 (The showiest is the best) Suppose a i a j and let ( 1 ; :::; n ) be a pure strategy equilibrium. Then, for all , i > j both in the AND and in the OR model.
Note that lower quality alternatives do not have any intrinsic disadvantage, in terms of salience enhancing technology, with respect to higher quality alternatives. The reason why they produce less salience in equilibrium does not derive from lower levels of resources or lower unit costs of salience production (as might be the case in a signalling story): every alternative can choose from exactly the same set at exactly the same cost or bene…t.
Relative salience: the ugly duckling can get picked most often
So far we have assumed that each alternative can select its own salience independently of the salience of the other alternative. In this sense salience was absolute. This is appropriate in some contexts, e.g. if repeated ads in favour of an alternative merely have the function of making the agent aware of the alternative ('did you know that people who read book A also read book B?'; 'have you considered using a scooter to go to work'?), with i representing either the probability that the agent is aware or the proportion of aware agents within a population. In other contexts, however, alternatives can only control variables that a¤ect salience in a relative way. If everybody else dresses in green you will be salient by dressing in yellow, and viceversa. If all other candidates converge on a given political message, you will be salient by deviating from that message. We call this the case of relative salience.
We show that in this case the neat equilibrium ordering obtained in proposition 6
breaks down. As a consequence, it is even possible that, in equilibrium, the worst alternative is selected with the highest probability.
Suppose now that each alternative a i selects a 'position' v i 2 [0; 1], and that own salience is determined by the entire pro…le of the v i 's. In particular, we assume that an alternative's salience is conferred by its di¤erence, in terms of position, from the 'average alternative'(excluding itself)
The alternatives aim as usual at maximising the probability of being chosen, where the probability is computed according to either the AND or te OR model.
Proposition 7
The AND model admits (for some n) a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which, for any , the worst alternative has the highest probability of being chosen.
Proposition 8
The OR model admits (for some n) a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which, for su¢ ciently small, the worst alternative has the highest probability of being chosen. For su¢ ciently high (for any n) the best alternative is chosen with the highest probability.
The di¤erence between these two results stems from the di¤erence between the AND the OR model we highlighted before: at degrees of rationality near one, the OR modelbut not the AND model -approximates well the standard utility maximisation model.
Proofs Proof of Proposition 3: De…ne as in the text
We have already observed that p AN D (a i ) is strictly increasing on the initial range of de…nition. We study the sign of
, which depends on the sign of the expression 
On the other hand, using the RHS in equation * and the de…nition of b and b b ,
a contradiction. Therefore there is at most one value of 2 (0; 1) at which
vanishes, from which (since Proof of Proposition 4: Di¤erentiate logarithmically and rearrange to obtain
(1 j ) ( j + (1 j ) ) which is negative for and j small enough. Conclude by noting that odds OR (i; j) is a positive function so that sign 
Let 1 be the solution to this problem. Now suppose inductively that for each i < j the game restricted to alternatives a 1 ; :::a j 1 has a pure strategy equilbrium 1 ; :::; j 1 .
Then the game between alternatives a 1 ; :::a j (of which 1; :::; j 1 are indi¤erent to the choice of alternative j) has the pure strategy equilbrium 1 ; :::; j , where j is a solution to the problem
So for any n the game has a pure strategy equilbrium.
A similar logic applies to the AND model.
Proof of Proposition 6:
Consider the OR model. By contradiction, suppose that a i a j but i < j . We use a revealed preference argument. Because i is optimal for alternative a i , it must provide a weakly higher expected payo¤ than j , that is:
Since i < j and < 1, we have ( i + (1 i ) ) ( j + (1 j ) ) < 0. Furthermore, since a i a j and thus i < j, we have that (1 )
Therefore the previous displayed equation implies
But then
Evaluating at v = (0; 0; 1) yields: To verify that v is an equilibrium, it is immediately checked that alternative 1 cannot pro…tably deviate from v . Turning now to alternative 2;compute:
Assume now that < . This implies that p OR (a 2 ; (0; v 2 ; 1)) can only be maximised at and it is easy to check that p OR (a 2 ; (0; 0; v 3 )) is maximised in v 3 = 0.
The second part of the statement follows trivially from inspection of the payo¤ functions.
Concluding remarks and related literature
The broad aim of this paper was to open the black box of 'bounded rationality' and statistical distributions in explaining choice errors that make an agent deviate from 'true' utility maximisation. Admittedly, we have opened just one box. Other explanations, beside consideration sets, may be relevant. Recently Rubinstein and Salant [21] have studied an agent who expresses di¤erent preferences under di¤erent frames of choice.
The link with this paper is that the set of such preferences is interpreted as a set of deviations from a true (welfare relevant) preference. However, their analysis takes a very di¤erent direction from ours in that it eschews any stochastic element. The probability model is, on the contrary, at the core of our theory.
There are also di¤erent plausible ways to model consideration sets and the competition for them. The already mentioned work by Eliaz and Spiegler [3] studies in great detail the competition between two …rms, who choose marketing strategies to make their products enter the consideration sets of a continuum of identical consumers. The choice model at the heart of this work is an application of Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay [9] , which is deterministic. Eliaz and Spiegler [3] also perform comparative statics exercises that relate to changes in rationality. One the main …ndings is that in some equilibria …rms do not increase their pro…ts compared to a situation in which consumers are fully rational (informed). More comparisons are made either by introducing in the population of boundedly rational consumers some rational consumers, or by changing the 'consideration function' (the function that determines the consideration set of consumers). One implication is that industry pro…ts are a non-monotonic function of changes in rationality thus de…ned.
A …rst general message from our paper is that 'revealed preferences'are not necessarily a better guide to discovering true preferences when the rationality of the agent is higher (namely when the agent has a higher probability of being better informed about the available alternatives). For example, suppose you can observe or infer the degrees of rationality, and 0 , under which two sets choices were made. Suppose that alternative
x is chosen more frequently over alternative y in condition than in condition 0 : it does not necessarily follow from the fact that > 0 that x is more likely to be better that y. Less rational agents (or agents choosing under worse informational conditions) may express their preference through choice more truthfully than more rational agents.
A second message is that the revealed preference ranking coincide (probabilistically) with the true preference relation in only two cases: if (1) salience is exogenous, or if (2) salience is endogenous but can be fully set by the alternatives (a yellow dress is salient).
But the revealed preference ranking can even reverse the true ranking when salience is endogenous and is relative (a yellow dress is salient when all other dresses are green).
